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Abstract
This paper contributes to a new line of research in the resource curse litera-
ture that addresses the link between resource wealth and fiscal policy by empirically in-
vestigating the relationship between natural resource dependence and public education 
spending. Using a large panel dataset of world countries covering the period from 1995 
to 2009, we find robust evidence of a public education spending resource curse. The 
adverse effect of natural resource dependence on public education expenditures rela-
tive to GDP remains significant after controlling for additional covariates such as income, 
aid, and the age structure of the population. Our results further confirm the existence of 
indirect effects of resource dependence through a deterioration of government account-
ability and the crowding-out of more skilled-labour intensive sectors in the economy. 
Furthermore, our findings indicate that the resource curse effect on the government 
prioritization of education mainly stems from point-source natural resources. Our re-
sults have important implications for managing natural resource wealth in developing 
countries, as they could achieve particularly high returns by investing resource revenues 
in public goods such as education. While this paper underlines the importance of institu-
tions and government accountability, our results also raise questions on the role of the 
extractives industry. The oil, gas and mining industry should consider increasing funding 
for education through Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives in this sector or through 
other innovative channels of development finance.
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1. Introduction
While in theory natural resource wealth provides a valuable source of revenues that 
could spur economic development, a large and buoyant literature documents the puzzling para-
dox that resource-rich countries seem to experience slower growth than their resource-poor 
counterparts. The debate on the existence of this so called “resource curse” effect on economic 
growth however, remains far from settled. 
Moreover, in light of the global commodity price boom, there has been a rising 
interest in innovative ways to convert natural resource wealth into human development. It has 
been noted that a large number of resource-rich countries appear to have human development 
indicators far below the levels that would be predicted on the basis of their income. The 2013 
Africa Progress Panel for example finds that most resource-rich countries in Africa have high 
levels of adult illiteracy and low levels of enrolment and school completion. These findings give 
rise to the idea that the resource curse extends beyond its hypothesized adverse impact on eco-
nomic growth. In order to enable the population in resource-rich countries to benefit from their 
vast natural resource endowments, understanding the intricate dynamics of the resource curse 
from a broader point of view is of the utmost importance. 
This paper will contribute to the literature by providing additional insights into the 
impact of natural resource wealth on government prioritization of human capital building. We 
focus on education as there is an increasing consensus on the importance of human capital for-
mation for securing sustainable economic growth. Mankiw et al. (1992) for example show that 
augmenting the Solow model with human capital accumulation generates much better results. 
Education in turn, is a crucial determinant of human capital and therefore an important driver of 
economic growth. Both the quantity and quality of education have been found to boost econom-
ic growth (Barro, 2001; Barro and Lee, 1994; Cohen and Soto, 2007; Hanushek and Woessmann, 
2007; Seetanah, 2009). Moreover, it has been argued that education allows for growth with 
equity (Tanzi and Chu, 1998) and that there are clear linkages between education and the reduc-
tion of poverty and inequality (Abdullah et al., 2013; Gregorio and Lee, 2002). Education has also 
been found to impact health outcomes and healthy behavior (Conti et al., 2010). Finally, Bravo-
Ortega and De Gregorio (2005) find that high levels of human capital, measured as the average 
years of schooling among the over-25 population, have allowed some resource-rich countries to 
escape the resource curse.
By zooming into the effect of natural resource wealth on government expenditures, 
rather than overarching development outcomes, we avoid capturing factors that are beyond pol-
icy makers’ control and are able to directly measure to what extent governments in resource-rich 
countries are committed to building human capital. Furthermore, several studies have found en-
couraging results with regards to the effectiveness of government spending on education. Using 
data from a sample of developing and transition countries, Gupta et al. (2002) find that increas-
ing government education expenditures by one percentage point of GDP on average raises gross 
secondary enrolment rates by over three per cent. Baldacci et al. (2003) present evidence from a 
similar sample that suggests that raising education spending by 1 percentage point of GDP would 
increase enrollment rates by 6 percentage points in the current period and another 3 percentage 
points in the following period. The authors further note that increased education expenditures 
are associated with improved health status. Jung and Thorbecke (2003) confirm the growth-
promoting benefits of public education expenditure and highlight its effectiveness in alleviating 
poverty. Blankenau et al. (2007) and Bose et al. (2007) conclude that education expenditures are 
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significantly associated with growth, contrary to other government outlays. Baldacci et al. (2008) 
find that education spending positively affects education capital which in turn contributes to 
economic growth. The results are replicated by Beraldo et al. (2009) who additionally find that 
the impact of public education expenditure is in fact larger compared to private spending. 
Using a large panel dataset of 140 countries covering the period from 1995 to 2009, 
we find that natural resource dependence is associated with lower public education expendi-
tures relative to GDP. This resource curse effect remains significant even after controlling for sev-
eral additional factors that have been found to play an important role in explaining public educa-
tion spending patterns. The results in our paper further demonstrate that this specific resource 
curse effect differs according to the type of natural resources. In particular, the dependence on 
point-source natural resources, with concentrated production and revenue patterns, rather than 
diffuse natural resources impedes government investment in education. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; the resource curse literature is 
discussed in Section 2. We describe the estimation strategy and data in Section 3. The fourth sec-
tion presents empirical evidence on the relationship between natural resource dependence and 
public education spending. Finally, Section 5 extends the paper by zooming into the difference 
between point-source and diffuse natural resources and Section 6 concludes.
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2. The natural resource curse: revisiting the literature
The link between natural resource endowments and economic growth was first in-
vestigated in light of the contrasting growth experiences of several East Asian countries com-
pared to much of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Auty (1993) introduced the phrase “re-
source curse” to refer to the paradox that natural resource wealth appears to generate poor 
economic growth rather than prosperity. This hypothesis was confirmed empirically by Sachs 
and Warner (1995; 1997; 2001), who show a significant and robust inverse relationship between 
the share of natural resource exports in GDP and economic growth. Their results have been 
replicated by Davis (2013) and elaborated by numerous other scholars. Auty (2001) for example 
finds that per capita income grows slower in countries with abundant natural resources. Bravo-
Ortega and De Gregorio (2005) conclude that natural resources have a positive effect on income, 
but a negative effect on its growth rate. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) distinguish between the 
direct and indirect effects of natural resource abundance. They find that while the former are 
positive, they are outweighed by the indirect negative effects. Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2007) 
on the contrary conclude that both direct and indirect effects of natural resource dependence on 
growth are negative. Collier and Goderis (2007) also report strong evidence of a resource curse 
on growth. The authors further disentangle the dynamics of the curse and find that while posi-
tive in the short run, the long term effects of commodity price booms are negative. 
Commonly proposed explanations of this resource curse effect include the Dutch 
Disease (Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Sachs and Warner, 1995; 1997) and volatility in general (van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). Collier and Hoeffler (2003) and Ross (2006) further argue that 
the availability of natural resources makes states more vulnerable to conflict. This association is 
however, disputed by several other scholars (Basedau and Lay, 2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 
2009; Cotet and Tsui, 2013).
A large wave of literature has focused on the political and institutional foundations 
of the resource curse. Leite and Weidmann (1999) and several other scholars (Bhattacharyya and 
Hodler, 2010; Robinson, 2006; Torvik, 2002 ;) demonstrate the interrelationships between natural 
resources, rent-seeking and economic growth. Bulte et al. (2005) find evidence that suggests an 
important indirect effect of natural resources on human welfare that operates through the qual-
ity of institutions. Mehlum et al. (2006) show that the quality of institutions determines whether 
countries avoid the resource curse or not. Collier and Goderis (2007) similarly report that only 
badly governed countries suffer from the resource curse after a commodity price boom. Kolstad 
and Wiig (2009) state that impartiality enhancing institutions1 in particular mitigate the negative 
effects of natural resources. As there is large variation between resource-rich countries, several 
scholars have favoured this type of conditional versions of the resource curse (Dunning, 2005). 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Isham et al. (2005) argue that only countries depend-
ent on point-source natural resources suffer from the resource curse. Hodler (2006), Baggio and 
Papyrakis (2010) and Fum and Hodler (2010) state that the effect of natural resources is condi-
tional upon ethnic fractionalization.  Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007) find that the resource curse 
effect is less severe in countries that are relatively open. Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) demon-
strate that the effect of natural resources is conditional upon electoral rule.
While the bulk of the literature continues to focus on the implications of vast natu-
ral resource endowments on economic growth or other measures of economic performance, a 
[1]   Impartiality enhancing institutions are defined as “institutions that reduce the possibility or attraction of 
favouritism versus acting in the general public interest” (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009).
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new line of research is investigating the resource curse from a broader point of view.  Bulte et al. 
(2005) find that “the resource curse appears to spill over from economic growth to a broader set 
of development indicators”. Several authors have established an important association between 
natural resource wealth and income inequality (Carmignani, 2013; Goderis and Malone, 2011; 
Gylfason and Zoega, 2002; Fum and Hodler, 2010). The relationship between natural capital and 
human capital accumulation has received particular interest as well. Gylfason et al. (1999) and 
Gylfason (2001) demonstrate that school enrolment tends to be inversely related to the share 
of natural capital in total national wealth. Kronenberg (2004) shows that this relationship holds 
for a sample of transition countries as well. Stijns (2006) similarly reports negative correlations 
for several indicators of natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation. Behbudi 
et al. (2010) demonstrate a negative relationship between natural resource abundance and sec-
ondary school attainment and adult and youth literacy rates. Cabrales and Hauk (2011) present 
empirical evidence that suggests that the effect of natural capital on enrolment is conditional 
upon the quality of political institutions. Blanco and Grier (2012) find that petroleum exports 
appear to have a negative effect on human capital in Latin-America, measured as the average 
years of (primary) schooling and Shao and Yang (2014) provide a theoretical rationale for the 
crowding-out effect of natural resource dependence on human capital. Other hypothesized ad-
verse implications of natural resource dependence include elevated prevalence and higher mor-
tality rates by HIV/AIDS because of a lack of effective public action (De Soysa and Gizelis, 2013). 
This paper will contribute to the small but growing literature that focuses on gov-
ernment expenditure in resource-rich countries in light of the hypothesis that natural resource 
revenues differ from other government revenues (Segal, 2012). Sarr and Wick (2010) demon-
strate a negative effect of natural resources on the provision of physical and social infrastructure. 
Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) similarly argue that while natural resource rents provide an 
opportunity for resource-rich developing countries to acquire public capital crucial for economic 
development, there is clear evidence that natural resource rents are on the contrary associated 
with reduced investment in public capital. Finally, using world panel data, Cockx and Francken 
(2014) establish the existence of a public health spending resource curse.
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3. Estimation strategy and data
The debate on the existence of the resource curse has put forward important meth-
odological concerns. Several authors have argued that as the research is prone to omitted varia-
ble bias it is paramount to move from cross-country to panel evidence (Collier and Goderis, 2007; 
Lederman and Maloney, 2008; Manzano and Rigobon, 2001; Van der Ploeg, 2008). We therefore 
base our analysis of public education expenditures upon a panel dataset of 140 countries2 for 
the period of 1995 to 2009, constructed for the aim of this research. In line with Brunschweiler 
and Bulte (2009), Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) and Cockx 
and Francken (2014), we have subdivided the data into three five year periods; from 1995 to 
1999, from 2000 to 2004 and finally from 2005 to 2009. The use of five year averages will allow 
us to handle annual volatility and measurement errors. The main descriptive statistics on the 
five year averages of the dependent and independent variables are summarized in Tables I and 
II respectively.
3.1. Public Education expenditures
To capture the government’s commitment to education, we use the World Bank 
data on public spending on education as a percentage of GDP (Public Education Expenditures), 
which are derived from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) who collect information annually 
from official national statistical authorities. Public expenditure on education consists of current 
and capital spending on both public and private education institutions, education administra-
tion and transfers or subsidies and includes expenditures funded by transfers from international 
sources to the government (UIS, 2014). 
Table I : Descriptive statistics on 5 year average Public Education Expenditures as a % of GDP ( source: World Bank)
Obs. Countries Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Overall Between Within
World 349 140 4.4369 1.7293 1.657404 0.5435 1.0005 13.8767
Africa 106 41 4.3238 2.1895 2.1284 0.6542 1.2930 13.8767
Asia 86 37 3.9387 1.3799 1.3763 0.5019 1.0517 6.9626
Eastern Europe 33 16 4.5615 1.1098 1.0445 0.4559 3.1643 8.1404
Western Europe 52 18 5.6037 1.2036 1.1531 0.4562 3.0563 8.3851
Latin Am. + Caribbean 56 22 4.0061 1.4902 1.4141 0.5142 1.0005 7.5948
North America 5 2 4.3093 1.2238 1.5467 0.2496 2.7936 5.4331
Oceania 11 4 5.7853 0.9756 0.8173 0.6623 4.8210 8.1321
3.2. The determinants of public education spending
3.2.1. Natural resources
While large natural capital endowments in theory provide an opportunity to build 
human capital as the revenues can serve as a new source of finance, the World Bank (2011) 
notes that “natural resources may in general hinder the process of human capital creation that is 
the basis of long term growth”. There are various explanations as to why natural resource wealth 
could negatively affect public education spending. A first line of argument stems from fiscal theo-
ries of governance, according to which the source of revenue is an important determinant of 
public expenditures. Moore (2001) refers to natural resource revenues as “unearned” state in-
[2]   Countries with populations of fewer than 150 000 individuals were excluded from the analysis. For a com-
plete overview of countries covered in the baseline regression analysis see Appendix B.
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come, to indicate that it entails little organizational and political effort in working with citizens 
and therefore allows for a certain degree of state autonomy and unaccountability. This discon-
nect could decrease the need to gain citizens’ support, which consequently diminishes incen-
tives to be responsive to citizens’ needs and provide public goods such as education. Bornhorst 
et al. (2009) and McGuirk (2013) find that large natural resource endowments reduce domestic 
revenue efforts. Second, Gylfason (2001) and Shao and Yang (2014) argue that the expansion of 
natural resource-based industries tends to lower the demand for high-skilled labour and pro-
vides limited incentives to invest in education. Moreover, the authors state that natural resource 
wealth can give rise to a disregard for human capital development and myopic behavior as the 
long-term value of education is underestimated. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) similarly argue 
that natural resource wealth creates a false sense of security and weakens the perceived need 
for growth-promoting strategies such as investment in education. Finally, the large fluctuations 
in commodity prices render government revenues in resource dependent countries highly vola-
tile. Such volatility contributes to poor planning and leads to boom and bust in public spending 
(Lane, 2003; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009).
As export-based proxies to measure natural resource wealth have often been 
subject of debate (Brunschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Lederman and Maloney, 2008), we prefer 
to derive our indicator of natural resource dependence from the World Bank database on the 
Changing Wealth of Nations, which comprises a set of “comprehensive wealth” accounts, includ-
ing elaborate estimates for natural capital for over 150 countries. In line with Cockx and Francken 
(2014), the World Bank (2011) and Gylfason (2001) we use the share of natural capital in total 
national wealth (Resource Dependence) to take into account a country’s structural reliance on 
natural resources.
	 Indirect	effects
In line with the previously mentioned explanations for the hypothesized adverse 
effect of natural resource wealth on public education spending, we specifically take into account 
the following proposed indirect effects of natural resource dependence.
 Unaccountability
According to the fiscal sociology paradigm, the fiscal link between citizens and their 
government is a strong determinant of government accountability (and Lien, 1985; Bird et al., 
2008; Moore, 2004; North and Weingast, 1989). As mentioned above, natural resource wealth 
represents an important source of unearned state income. In the presence of a sure source of 
income, governments can acquire a certain degree of autonomy as they no longer need to be 
responsive to citizens’ policy preferences to induce a greater willingness to pay taxes.  McGuirk 
(2013) in fact hypothesizes that in the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower 
the burden of taxation in order to reduce demand for accountability. Moreover, Collier (2006) 
finds that lower domestic tax effort in resource-rich countries diminishes the incentive for public 
scrutiny of the government. Ross (2003) further argues that governments that have access to 
large natural resource revenues tend to use them to quell dissent, again contributing to reduced 
accountability.
Government accountability can be expected to affect both the level and the com-
position of public spending. Besley and Case (1995) show that accountability has a significantly 
positive effect on total government expenditures per capita. Persson and Tabellini (2004) con-
clude that more accountable regimes are associated with more public goods and larger welfare 
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programs. Delavallade (2006) finds that “lack of freedom”, which reflects unaccountability, dis-
torts public spending away from social expenditure towards sectors that generate high rents.
We will study this proposed indirect effect of natural resource dependence by in-
cluding the Polity IV indicator on executive constraints (Accountability). This measure captures 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. Limitations may 
be imposed by any “accountability groups”, which are usually legislatures in Western democra-
cies and a strong independent judiciary in many states. This measure captures the checks and 
balances between various parts of the decision-making process. In addition, we consider the 
possibility that the effect of resource dependence is conditional upon the degree of account-
ability by adding an interaction term to our regression.
	 Electoral	competition	
A substantial literature investigates the hypothesis that natural resource wealth 
impedes democratization (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011). Collier and 
Hoeffler (2005a) conclude that natural resource rents undermine electoral competition thereby 
facilitating patronage politics and reducing public goods provision in the process. Mulligan and 
Tsui (2008) develop a theoretical model where different sources of income have different effects 
on the level of electoral competition. The authors demonstrate that the discovery of natural re-
sources leads to an equilibrium outcome where the political structure is less competitive.
Electoral competition has been argued to affect the public economy and fiscal 
policy. Comiskey (1993) finds a robust positive relationship between electoral competition and 
the growth of public spending as a percentage of GDP. Zooming into the sectoral decomposi-
tion of government expenditures, Brown and Hunter (1999) and Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
(2001) confirm that democracies in Latin America tend to spend more on education. Hecock 
(2006) finds that greater electoral competition leads to increased spending on primary educa-
tion. Stasavage (2005) develops a game-theoretic model which suggests that the need to obtain 
an electoral majority may have prompted African governments to spend more on education. 
The author confirms this hypothesis empirically with regards to government education spending 
relative to GDP.
We consider the possibility of an indirect effect through electoral competition 
by including the Polity IV project indicator on the Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment 
(Electoral Competition). According to Gurr (1974) competitiveness refers to “the extent that 
prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordi-
nates”. The indicator equals zero if transfers of power are unregulated. Hereditary succession, 
designation or a combination of both corresponds to a value of 1. Dual systems or transitional 
arrangements, where one of the executives is chosen by hereditary succession and the other by 
competitive election, and competitive elections are assigned the values of 2 and 3 respectively. 
Similar to Mehlum et al. (2006) and Collier and Goderis (2007) and in line with Andersen and 
Aslaksen (2008) and Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014), who find that the resource curse effect is 
conditional upon electoral rule, we investigate whether the impact of natural resource wealth 
alters conditional on the degree of electoral competition. To this end, we study the interaction 
effect between natural resource dependence and electoral competition.
 Structure of the economy
Resource wealth has been found to affect the structure of the economy. Large natu-
ral capital endowments have been associated with the decline of the non-natural resource sec-
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tor3 (Manzano and Rigbon, 2001). 
We hypothesize that the structure of the economy in turn affects public spending 
on education. The importance of different sectors in the economy is likely to determine the 
demand for skilled labor which will influence the demand for education and to the extent that 
public education expenditure is demand driven, subsequent spending. 
Assuming that especially growth in the service industry4 will spur demand for educa-
tion, we capture this potential indirect effect by including the value added in services as a share 
of GDP (Services). Data are derived from the World Bank and are based upon World Bank and 
OECD National Accounts. Services are defined according to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) and includes sale, retail, hotels and restaurants, 
transport, financial, real estate, government and social and personal service activities.
Volatility
Natural resource wealth can be argued to give rise to particularly volatile revenues. 
This volatility could in turn potentially influence public spending on education, as it complicates 
long term planning and has been found to induce a certain degree of myopic behaviour (Van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009), which could give rise to a disregard for building human capital.
Similar to Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) and in line with Cockx and Francken 
(2014), we derive our measure of volatility as follows:
Where GDP pc stands for Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, i represents a country, 
t time, τ the five year period and N the number of observations.
Conflict
As mentioned above, while it remains subject of debate (Basedau and Lay, 2009; 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Cotet and Tsui, 2013), it has commonly been argued that coun-
tries that rely heavily on natural resources tend to be more vulnerable to conflict (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2003; Lujala, 2010; Ross, 2004; 2006). Moreover, the occurrence of conflict could alter 
government priorities and subsequent expenditures.
We consider this indirect effect by adding a dummy variable (Conflict) that equals 
one for every 5 year period during which conflict was reported to take place in the country ac-
cording to the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset. Conflict is defined here as “a contested incom-
patibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
[3]     According to the Dutch Disease theory, a resource boom can give rise to an expansion of both the natural re-
source sector and the non-traded sector. Some authors have therefore proposed that natural resource wealth is asso-
ciated with faster service sector growth. We dismiss this hypothesis however, as it is based on the assumption that the 
“spending effect” (increased income from the resource boom is assumed to raise aggregate demand for non-traded 
goods) dominates the “resource movement effect” (factors of production are shifted towards the booming resource-
sector), which is unlikely to hold especially since Corden (1984) mentions that a complication that is overlooked is that 
the spending effect isn’t necessarily positive as it will depend on the resource movement effect via income distribu-
tion. Le Billon (2001) additionally stresses that the decline of the resource-sector will be set in motion because efforts 
are increasingly allocated to rent-seeking activities.
[4]    Using the value added in both the manufacturing and services doesn’t alter our main results. However, we 
find that the value added in services is a better predictor of public education expenditures.
(1)                       𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  �∑�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤.�����������������������²𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
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deaths” (UCD/PRIO, 2014) Alternatively, to capture the long-term effects of conflict, we counted 
the years in which no conflict was reported (Peace).
3.2.2. Income
According to Wagner’s law there exists a positive association between economic 
development and government public spending as a percentage of GDP over time. Busemeyer 
(2007) finds a strong positive association between income and public education spending for 21 
OECD countries. Akanbi and Schoeman (2010) confirm this positive effect of GDP per capita on 
education spending for a sample of 15 African countries. Moreover, to the extent that income is 
a measure for the degree of economic development, it can be expected to influence the demand 
for skilled labour and therefore the demand for education. We take into account the effect of 
income by including the logarithm of World Bank data on GDP per capita reported in constant 
2005 US Dollar, at the start of every five year period (GDP).
3.2.3. Aid
By mobilizing additional resources for financing education, aid can be assumed to 
relax macroeconomic budget constraints. Moreover, we hypothesize that as donors stress the 
importance of education, government priorities could be affected and shift more towards this 
particular sector. Another line of thought is related to concerns about fungibility of aid, in which 
case aid would have a depressing effect on domestic spending on education. Van de Sijpe (2012) 
however finds that aid leads to at most, a small displacement of domestic spending in the educa-
tion sector.
To capture the effect of aid, we include five year averages of the OECD/DAC Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS) data on one year-lagged commitments of Official Development as a per-
centage of GDP (Aid). We assume zero-values for countries for which aid flows are not reported 
in the OECD/DAC database. 
3.2.4. Age distribution
It can be argued that public expenditure on education is driven by demand factors, 
which will in turn be influenced by the demographic structure of a country (Boix, 1998). Besley 
and Case (2003) and Archibald and Feldman (2006) for example include controls for the propor-
tion of the population aged 65 and above as well as aged 5 to 17 in their analysis of government 
spending and public education expenditures respectively. Alesina et al. (1999) find that the per-
centage of the population aged 65 and above has a negative effect on the share of public spend-
ing going to education. Poterba (1998) finds that a higher share of the population aged 65 years 
and above is associated with a significant reduction in per child educational spending. These 
results are confirmed by Harris et al. (2001), Rizzo (2006) and Grob and Wolter (2007).
There is however, an alternative hypothesis on the impact of an older population 
on education expenditures that potentially explains the mixed results. Poterba (1998) point to 
the possibility of intergeneration externalities that may lead older voters to support educational 
spending even though it does not benefit them directly. Richman and Stagner (1986) argue that 
a rising number of elderly may in fact exert a positive effect on education spending, to the ex-
tent that the elderly want to seek to raise the training of young workers, so that they generate 
a larger pool of resources from which transfers can be funded and to improve the quality of 
services they receive.
We control for the effect of the demographic structure of a country on public educa-
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tion spending by including the proportion of the population aged 65 and above (Pop.>65) in our 
regression analysis. The data are gathered from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database.
Table II: Descriptive statistics 
Obs. Countries Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Overall Between Within
3.2.1 Resource Dependence 349 140 26.4046 30.6927 29.0247 7.809399 0 243.9587
3.2.1.1 Accountability 326 131 5.1972 1.8813 1.8199 .5139091 1 7
3.2.1.2 Democracy 323 130 6.0351 3.7277 3.6349 .9326408 0 10
3.2.1.3 Services 337 138 55.6697 13.0609 13.2896 2.753028 21.9663 92.2521
3.2.1.4 Volatility 340 138 11.6430 21.6533 22.2531 12.95648 0.0602 187.7653
3.2.1.5 Peace 349 140 30.6363 24.1666 23.8671 4.85975 0 62
3.2.2 GDP 349 140 8.0732 1.70389 1.6658 .110585 4.8481 11.1964
3.2.3 Aid 349 140 5.1829 9.3034 11.0192 2.348509 0 103.6711
3.2.4 Pop.>65 349 140 7.6083 5.1116 5.0274 .4947741 1.0005 21.0439
Source : World Bank, Polity IC, UCD/PRIO
In sum, the baseline empirical model is of the following form:
where i represents a country, t time, α the country fixed effect and ɛ the error term. 
(2)                          𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸. > 65)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
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4. Results and discussion
4.1. The impact of natural resource dependence on public education  
 expenditures
Before proceeding to the results, here are some remarks about the data analysis. 
In line with Manzano and Rigobon (2001), Murshed (2004), Collier and Goderis (2007), Haber 
and Menaldo (2009) Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) and Cockx and Francken (2014), we have 
opted to include country-specific fixed effects, as these will effectively control for all unobserv-
able time-invariant country characteristics. To address any remaining within-country correlation, 
we use cluster-robust standard deviations. We check for collinearity with the diagnostic tools 
developed by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) and find that the conditioning numbers are well 
below the suggested cut-off value of 30, indicating that there are no problems with collinearity. 
Finally, to identify outliers, we use the multivariate outlier detection method of Billor, Hadi and 
Velleman (2001). The tables below display the results of the regression applied to the entire 
sample as well as to the restricted sample.
Table III: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Education Expenditures
excl. outl. excl. outl. excl. outl. excl.outl.
Res. Dep. -0.0155** 
(0.023)
-0.0262*** 
(0.001)
-0.0129* 
(0.066)
-0.0198*** 
(0.009)
-0.0151** 
(0.023)
-0.0129** 
(0.047)
-0.0155** 
(0.018)
-0.0121* 
(0.057)
GDP 0.7381** 
(0.022)
0.6963** 
(0.023)
0.7263** 
(0.021)
0.7670** 
(0.014)
0.5038 
(0.177)
0.6070   
(0.102)
Aid 0.0510*** 
(0.001)
0.0484 
(0.161)
0.0513*** 
(0.001)
0.0489*   
(0.082)
Pop.>65 0.0961 
(0.162)
0.0861 
(0.205)
Obs. 349 328 349 337 349 338 349 344
Countries 140 132 140 137 140 137 140 138
Within R² 0.0496 0.0777 0.0708 0.0880 0.1185 0.1007 0.1242 0.1036
Between R² 0.0523 0.0684 0.0910 0.1445 0.0975 0.1507 0.0913 0.0968
Overall R² 0.0465 0.0610 0.0987 0.1597 0.1140 0.1791 0.1034 0.1043
Notes:  
Res. Dep. stands for Resource Dependence. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
The results of the baseline regression specification summarized in Table III confirm 
the existence of a resource curse effect on public education spending. The share of natural capi-
tal in total national wealth (Resource Dependence), has a significantly negative effect on public 
education expenditures relative to GDP. This adverse effect is robust to excluding outliers and re-
mains highly significant even after controlling for the level of income, aid and demographic and 
time-invariant country characteristics. According to these estimations, keeping all else equal, a 
ten per cent increase in the share of natural capital in total national wealth is on average asso-
ciated with a decrease in public spending on education of approximately 0.16 per cent of GDP. 
Keeping in mind that the world average expenditure on education was 4.44 per cent of GDP, this 
represents a considerable decrease in government funding for education. Results not reported 
in this paper5 further indicate that this resource curse effect on education spending is particu-
larly strong in Africa. 
[5]   Additional information can be obtained from the corresponding author upon request.
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Conform to Wagner’s law the regression results support the hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between the level of income and public spending on education. We find a highly 
significant, positive effect of the logarithm of GDP per capita (GDP) on educational spending in all 
but one of the regression specifications. Our results further indicate that a higher share of ODA 
commitments in GDP (Aid) is on average associated with higher public education expenditures. 
The effect of Aid however, loses significance when excluding outliers. We don’t find evidence for 
the hypothesized role of the age structure of the population as a determinant of public educa-
tion spending. This is however, in line with the results from Miller (1996) and Ladd and Murray 
(1999) who don’t find a robust significant negative effect of the share of elderly in a fixed-effects 
model.
Table IV: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Education Expenditures
excl. outl. excl. outl. excl. outl. excl. outl.
Resource 
Dependence
-0.0193*** 
(0.001)
-0.0162*** 
(0.005)
-0.0165*** 
(0.004)
 -0.0137** 
(0.015)
-0.0093 
(0.150)
-0.0061 
(0.312)
-0.0137** 
(0.025)
-0.0137** 
(0.025)
GDP 0.2997 
(0.383)
0.3950 
(0.245)
0.5156 
(0.133)
0.6115* 
(0.074)
0.5100 
(0.147)
0.6297* 
(0.071)
0.3458 
(0.292)
0.3458 
(0.292)
Aid 0.0449*** 
(0.001)
0.0481*** 
(0.002)
0.0453*** 
(0.003)
0.0488*** 
(0.004)
0.0404** 
(0.017)
0.0441** 
(0.014)
0.0360** 
(0.024)
0.0360** 
(0.024)
Pop.>65 0.0772 
(0.222)
0.0676 
(0.273)
0.0581 
(0.339)
0.0485 
(0.414)
0.0147 
(0.821)
0.0101 
(0.874
0.0251 
(0.694)
0.0251 
(0.694)
Accountability 0.2968*** 
(0.003)
0.2829*** 
(0.005)
0.2856*** 
(0.005)
0.2856*** 
(0.005)
Electoral 
Competition
0.4310*** 
(0.000)
0.3980*** 
(0.001)
Services 0.0414*** 
(0.008)
0.0368** 
(0.018)
0.0346** 
(0.026)
0.0346** 
(0.026)
Obs. 326 323 323 320 337 334 316 315
Countries 131 130 130 129 138 137 129 128
Within R² 0.2349 0.2177 0.2281 0.2086 0.1573 0.1426 0.2628 0.2628
Between R² 0.0897 0.0905 0.1019 0.1001 0.0990 0.0971 0.0882 0.0904
Overall R² 0.0991 0.0999 0.1162 0.1146 0.1070 0.1059 0.0963 0.0972
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
Next, we assess the role of the different proposed indirect effects of natural re-
sources; accountability, electoral competition, the structure of the economy and the related 
demand for skilled labour, macroeconomic volatility and the occurrence of conflict. Table IV sum-
marizes the main regression results.
The indicator of executive constraints (Accountability) is significant at the one per 
cent level. In line with our hypothesis, the positive coefficient implies that a higher score, which 
corresponds to more restrictions on executive actions and greater accountability, is associated 
with higher government spending on education. We further note that there is some indica-
tion that the impact of resource dependence is weaker when governments are subject to more 
constraints and held accountable. The interaction term between Accountability and Resource 
Dependence is significantly positive for the entire sample (see Table A1, Appendix A).
Our results strongly suggest that the need to obtain citizens’ support in elections in-
duces higher public spending on education, as the positive coefficient for Electoral Competition 
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is highly significant. Moreover, in line with Mehlum et al. (2006) and Collier and Goderis (2007), 
our results suggest that the effect of natural resource dependence alters conditional upon the 
level of electoral competition. The interaction effect with natural resource dependence is signifi-
cantly positive for the entire sample, indicating that the resource curse effect on public educa-
tion spending is weaker when there exists strong electoral competition (see Table A1, Appendix 
A). 
We assess the role of the structure of the economy and its related demand for 
skilled labor in stimulating education spending by introducing a variable that captures the impor-
tance of the service industry.  The positive coefficient for the value added in services as a share 
of GDP (Services) is highly significant. Hence, these results indicate that the importance of the 
service industry in the economy exerts a positive influence on public education expenditures. For 
the purpose of this paper however, it is interesting to note that by adding this indicator, the ef-
fect of natural resource dependence declines both in magnitude and significance. This suggests 
that part of the adverse effect of natural resource dependence on public education spending can 
be explained by the crowding out of more skilled-labour intensive sectors. 
We don’t find any evidence for the hypothesis that macroeconomic volatility ham-
pers government spending on education. Nor do our results indicate that the occurrence of 
conflict adversely affects the importance attributed to education.
As Electoral Competition is no longer significant, when Accountability and Services 
are included in the regression analysis (see Table A2, Appendix A), we conclude that the results 
suggest that unaccountability and the crowing out of skilled-labour intensive sectors act as main 
transmission channels of the adverse impact of natural resource dependence on public health 
spending. In sum, we start from the following equation to investigate the direct and indirect ef-
fects of natural resource dependence in line with the methodology from Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004).
(3)                          𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸. > 65)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Next, we estimate the effect of natural resource dependence on the value added in services:
(4)                            𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕0 +  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5)                            𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Where i represents a country, t time,  and  the country fixed effects and  and  the error 
terms.
Substituting this into equation 2 yields: 
(6)                          𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + (𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾0) +  [𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 + (𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾1)]𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸. > 65)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽6𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Where is the direct effect of resource dependence on 
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public spending on education and  represents the indirect 
effect that operates through increased unaccountability and the diminished importance of the 
service industry. The results suggest that the latter represents about 20 per cent of the total 
resource curse effect on public education spending.
4.2. Robustness checks
We conduct several tests to examine the robustness of our results. First, we include 
time-fixed effects in our baseline regression model (see Appendix, Table A3). By incorporating 
these dummy variables, we control for unobserved effects that vary over time as well as over 
countries. As the coefficient for resource dependence decreases neither in magnitude or signifi-
cance, we find that the adverse effect of natural resource dependence is robust to controlling 
for time fixed effects. 
Second, we want to control for the possibility that education spending depends 
on previous education expenditures. We therefore use the annual data for all our variables and 
develop a dynamic regression specification where we include the lag of education expenditures 
as an explanatory variable. To fully capture the dynamic nature of our 15 year panel, we are 
obliged to refrain from using our preferred measure of natural resource dependence, the share 
of natural capital in total wealth, and replace it with a similar indicator; the share of natural re-
source rents6 in GDP. Similar measures have been used by authors such as Atkinson and Hamilton 
(2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2005b), de Soysa and Neumayer (2007).
As traditional panel data estimators are no longer consistent, we apply the instru-
mental variables first difference estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in line with 
Lederman and Maloney (2008) (see Appendix A, Table A4). We find no evidence of a dynamic 
relationship in public spending on education, as the lagged dependent variable is not statistically 
significant. Moreover, controlling for this dynamic relation doesn’t alter our main results; the 
negative coefficient for natural resource dependence remains highly significant.
[6]   Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral 
rents, and forest rents.
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5. Extension: point source and diffuse natural resources
It has been argued that the type of resource matters. In particular, several authors 
have made the distinction between point-source and diffuse natural resources based on the 
concentration of production and revenue patterns. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) ar-
gue that only point-source natural resources, that are extracted from a narrow geographic or 
economic zone and typically generate rents that are easily appropriable, are associated with 
poor economic growth. Isham et al. (2005) corroborate these findings and conclude that only 
countries dependent on point-source natural resources are subject to “heightened economic 
and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity”, which in turn impedes their ability to 
manage shocks and economic transitions. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) demonstrate that 
the detrimental volatility associated with the resource curse increases only with higher shares of 
point-source natural resources in GDP. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) in turn argue that point-
source dependence can result in high inequality, facilitates the appropriation of resource rev-
enues and breeds corruption. Mavrotas et al. (2011) conclude that point-source rather than dif-
fuse resource exporting countries are prone to growth failure due to institutional failure. Finally, 
Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) show evidence of a resource curse effect on the provision of 
public capital in the case of point-source natural resources, but not in the case of agricultural and 
forestry resources. 
To explore whether the resource curse effect on public education expenditures 
differs according to the type of natural resources, we create two new variables based on the 
World Bank database on the Changing Wealth of Nations; Point-source Resource Dependence 
and Diffuse Resource Dependence. Our definition of point-source natural resources coincides 
with the World Bank definition of subsoil assets and includes oil, natural gas, coal and minerals. 
Diffuse natural resources are defined in this paper as the sum of crops, pasture, and timber and 
non-timber forest. We measure dependence by looking at the share of both types of resources 
in total national wealth. 
In line with Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014), we first test the hypothesis by includ-
ing point-source and diffuse resource dependence separately and we finally control for both 
resources in the same regression. The results are summarized in Table V.
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Table V: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Education Expenditures
excl. outl. excl. outl. excl. outl.
Point-source Resource Dependence -0.0274*** 
(0.000)
-0.0202** 
(0.050)
-0.0289*** 
(0.000)
-0.0208** 
(0.042)
Diffuse Resource Dependence -0.0057 
(0.471)
-0.0093 
(0.277)
-0.0073 
(0.329)
-0.0084 
(0.287)
GDP 1.1490***   
(0.005)
1.0754** 
(0.012)
0.8554** 
(0.047)
0.7940* 
(0.066)
1.1766*** 
(0.004)
1.0598** 
(0.015)
Aid 0.0486*** 
(0.005)
0.0499*** 
(0.006)
0.0443** 
(0.012)
0.0357 
(0.198)
0.0492***
(0.002)
0.0512*** 
(0.002)
Pop.>65 0.0450 
(0.503)
0.0505 
(0.457)
0.0506 
(0.462)
0.0446 
(0.519)
0.0192 
(0.769)
0.0281 
(0.673)
Obs. 349 344 340 336 340 336
Countries 140 137 137 136 137 135
Within R² 0.1350 0.1065 0.0889 0.0823 0.1543 0.1255
Between R² 0.1033 0.0963 0.0952 0.1013 0.1120 0.1078
Overall R² 0.1142 0.1072 0.1131 0.1199 0.1260 0.1200
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
We find that the effect of point-source resource dependence is highly significant 
and has a considerably larger impact on public education expenditures compared to the previ-
ously established effect of natural resource dependence as a whole. Keeping all else equal, a ten 
per cent increase in the share of point-source natural resources in total national wealth is on 
average associated with a decrease in public education spending of 0.27 per cent of GDP. In line 
with the literature, we find no evidence of a natural resource curse effect on public education 
spending for diffuse resource dependence. Finally, when controlling for both resources in the 
same regression, we find similar results. Other coefficients also seem to be plausibly estimated 
and are similar to earlier findings.
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6. Conclusion
While education is widely perceived as a key driver of sustainable economic growth 
and human development and human capital development could contribute to much-needed 
diversification in resource-rich countries, several authors posit that “natural capital crowds out 
human capital” (e.g. Gylfason, 2001; Shao and Yang, 2014). 
By studying whether this finding is reflected in government spending, this paper 
contributes to a new line of research in the resource curse literature that addresses the link be-
tween natural resource wealth and fiscal policy. In particular, we provide empirical evidence on 
the relationship between natural resource dependence and public education spending. Not only 
is this focus on expenditures rather than overarching outcomes novel in the literature, it enables 
us to capture the impact of natural resource wealth on government priorities as education ex-
penditures are under direct government control.  
Using a global panel dataset covering the period from 1995 to 2009, we find clear 
evidence of a public education spending resource curse. There is a significant adverse association 
between natural resource dependence and public education expenditures relative to GDP that is 
robust to controlling for additional covariates such as income, aid, and the age structure of the 
population. Our results further confirm the existence of indirect effects of natural resource de-
pendence through a deterioration of government accountability and the crowding-out of more 
skilled-labour intensive sectors in the economy. We also find that government accountability 
and electoral competition can mitigate this mentioned resource curse effect. Furthermore, our 
findings indicate that the resource curse effect on the government prioritization of education 
mainly stems from point-source natural resources that are extracted from a narrow geographic 
or economic zone and give rise to easily appropriable rents. 
Our results have important implications for managing natural resource wealth in 
developing countries, as they could achieve particularly high returns by investing resource rev-
enues in public goods such as education. While this paper underlines the importance of institu-
tions and government accountability, our results also raise questions on the role of the extrac-
tives industry. The oil, gas and mining industry should consider increasing funding for education 
through Corporate Social responsibility initiatives in this sector or other innovative channels of 
development finance.
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Appendix A : Additional regression results
TableA1: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Education  Expenditures  
(including interaction effects)
excl. outl. excl.outl.
Resource Dependence -0.0334*** 
(0.000)
-0.0311** 
(0.021)
-0.0230*** 
(0.000)
-0.0244** 
(0.024)
GDP 0.4569
(0.176)
0.4868 
(0.151)
0.6853** 
(0.046)
0.7102** 
(0.041)
Aid 0.0408** 
(0.014)
0.0433**
(0.018)
0.0466*** 
(0.007)
0.0476 
(0.009)
Pop.>65 0.0689 
(0.252)
0.0650 
(0.275)
0.0458 
(0.423)
0.0436 
(0.441)
Accountability 0.1806 
(0.192)
0.1863 
(0.222)
Electoral Competition 0.2472 0.2266
(0.146) (0.300)
Res.Dep.*Acc. 0.0032** 
(0.045)
0.0029 
(0.219)
Res.Dep.*Electoral Competition 0.0044** 
(0.013)
0.0050 
(0.215)
Obs. 326 322 323 320
Countries 131 129 130 129
Within R² 0.2523 0.2274 0.2447 0.2172
Between R² 0.0921 0.0957 0.1075 0.1034
Overall R² 0.1035 0.1029  0.1248 0.1197
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
Res. Dep and Elect. Comp. stand for Resource Dependence and Electoral Competition respectively.
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TableA2: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Education  Expenditures
excl.outl. excl. outl. excl.outl. excl.outl.
Resource 
Dependence
-0.0133
(0.029)
-0.0133** 
(0.029)
-0.0123*** 
(0.005)
-0.0091* 
(0.064)
-0.0156** 
(0.019)
-0.0112* 
(0.055)
-0.0154** 
(0.020)
-0.0111* 
(0.057)
GDP 0.5316* 
(0.097)
0.5316* 
(0.097)
0.3249*** 
(0.008)
0.3863*** 
(0.002)
0.5132 
(0.175)
0.6478* 
(0.086)
0.4739 
(0.188)
0.5798 
(0.109)
Aid 0.0352** 
(0.031)
0.0352** 
(0.031)
0.0368*** 
(0.006)
0.0546*** 
(0.000)
0.0508*** 
(0.001)
0.0540*** 
(0.001)
0.0507** 
(0.001)
0.0537*** 
(0.001)
Pop.>65 0.0102 
(0.867)
0.0102 
(0.867)
0.0125 
(0.723)
0.0171 
(0.630)
0.0954 
(0.167)
0.0825 
(0.226)
0.0909 
(0.202)
0.0783 
(0.266)
Accountability 0.2715* 
(0.066)
0.2715* 
(0.066)
Electoral 
Competition
0.0593 
(0.726)
0.0593 
(0.726)
Services 0.0317** 
(0.046)
0.0317** 
(0.046)
Volatility -0.0018 
(0.395)
-0.0023 
(0.280)
Conflict -0.1402 
(0.464)
-0.2504 
(0.166)
Peace 0.0028   
(0.645)
0.0036 
(0.548)
Obs. 311 310 340 336 348 345 349 346
Countries 127 126 138 136 140 139 140 139
Within R² 0.2792 0.2792 0.1269 0.1121 0.1263 0.1216 0.1247 0.1160
Between R² 0.1001 0.1013 0.0920 0.1051 0.0949 0.0985 0.0966 0.1002
Overall R² 0.1113 0.1117 0.1129 0.1231 0.1071  0.1102 0.1076 0.1098
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
Res. Dep and Elect. Comp. stand for Resource Dependence and Electoral Competition respectively.
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Table A3: Results fixed effects regressions on  
Public Education Expenditures incl. time fixed effects
excl. outl.
Resource Dependence -0.0162** 
(0.016)
-0.0134**   
(0.042)
GDP 0.4089 
(0.427)
0.3805 
(0.453)
Aid 0.0464*** 
(0.003)
0.0362 
(0.224)
Pop.>65 0.0815 
(0.317)
0.0619 
(0.445)
Time fixed effects
2000-2004 0.1368 
(0.205)
0.1688 
(0.132)
2005-2009 0.0755 
(0.710)
0.1324 
(0.501)
Obs. 349 344
Countries 140 138
Within R² 0.1321 0.1139
Between R² 0.0907 0.0973
Overall R² 0.1029 0.1039
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
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Table A4: Results first difference instrumental variables regressions on  
Public Education Expenditures
excl. outl.
Public Education Expenditures 
t-1
0.1313 
(0.571)
0.1378 
(0.552)
Resource Dependence -0.0387*** 
(0.000)
-0.0387*** 
(0.000)
GDP -1.8454*** 
(0.001)
-1.8561*** 
(0.001)
Aid 0.0004 
(0.958)
0.0010 
(0.887)
Pop.>65 0.1694 
(0.293)
0.1668 
(0.302)
Obs. 698 697
Countries 124 123
Within R² 0.0251 0.0268
Between R² 0.5531 0.5518
Overall R² 0.0257 0.0243
Notes: 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors.
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Appendix B : List of countries
Albania France Moldova Uruguay
Algeria Gabon Mongolia Vanuatu
Angola Gambia, The Morocco Venezuela, RB
Argentina Georgia Mozambique Vietnam
Armenia Germany Namibia Zambia
Australia Ghana Nepal
Austria Greece Netherlands
Azerbaijan Guatemala New Zealand
Bahrain Guinea Nicaragua
Bangladesh Guinea-Bissau Niger
Belarus Guyana Norway
Belgium Honduras Oman
Belize Hong Kong SAR, China Pakistan
Benin Hungary Panama
Bhutan Iceland Peru
Bolivia India Philippines
Botswana Indonesia Poland
Brazil Iran, Islamic Rep. Portugal
Brunei Darussalam Ireland Romania
Bulgaria Israel Russian Federation
Burkina Faso Italy Rwanda
Burundi Jamaica Saudi Arabia
Cambodia Japan Senegal
Cameroon Jordan Sierra Leone
Canada Kenya Singapore
Central African Republic Korea, Rep. Slovak Republic
Chad Kuwait South Africa
Chile Kyrgyz Republic Spain
China Lao PDR Sri Lanka
Colombia Latvia St. Lucia
Comoros Lesotho Swaziland
Congo, Rep. Liberia Sweden
Costa Rica Lithuania Switzerland
Cote d’Ivoire Luxembourg Syrian Arab Republic
Croatia Macao SAR, China Tajikistan
Cyprus Macedonia, FYR Thailand
Czech Republic Madagascar Togo
Denmark Malawi Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic Malaysia Tunisia
Ecuador Maldives Turkey
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mali Uganda
El Salvador Malta Ukraine
Ethiopia Mauritania United Arab Emirates
Fiji Mauritius United Kingdom
Finland Mexico United States
 
